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MEXICAN STANDARDS RELATED POLICY AND REGULATION
LIC. JOSt AUGUSTfN PORTAL*
The development of Mexican standards related policy and regulation is a topic
I have close to my heart because I was involved both in the development of
standards in Mexico and was responsible for the negotiations of Chapter Nine of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) dealing with Standards Related
Measures. However, since it has been almost ten years since those negotiations I
may distort a portion of what happened.
I. THE FRAMEWORK
In thinking about how to state the issue of potential differences to arise in the
standards related rles and policies between the United States and Mexico, and the
clashes that can arise in this area, a famous old American song came into my mind.
"I say tomato you say tomatoe. I say potato you say potatoe ............... let's call
the whole thing off."
Something of that sort is always prone to happen under the disciplines of
NAFTA' s standards related measures. There are so many issues that may be treated
differently from one country to another under the technical regulations fields, that,
to say the least, Chapter Nine of NAFTA presented and will continue to offer very
delicate issues in the trade relationship among the three NAFTA nations.
In general terms one would say that the framework for the negotiations during the
early 90's was that the negotiations started with almost no agreement on the basics.
Neither Mexico, the United States nor Canada was ready or willing to let go of its
national technical regulations or standards system, to accept that of the other
countries. However the goal was to reach a common understanding on how to solve
any differences in this area.
With three countries unwilling to make concessions, it is not surprising that the
result of the disciplines in Chapter Nine are not as precise as one would expect, but
its importance derives from the fact that, as with other aspects of international
relationships, a real key to success is to avoid the technical barriers to
communication. Therefore, the real value of Chapter Nine is the creation of
trilateral committees, sub-committees and working groups that should be able to
discuss the issues and timely solve any differences.
This article will attempt to explain the history and the present state of affairs on
this issue.
II. THE HISTORY
To better understand some of the problems faced by Mexico during the early
90's, when NAFTA negotiations began, in dealing with technical barriers to trade,
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it is important to remember that the special terminology of GATT and its permutations were generally unfamiliar to Mexico until 1986, when Mexico joined GATT.'
Before GATT and of course, many years before NAFrA, the Mexican office of
Standards (DireccionGeneralde Normas) of Mexico had concentrated authority for
the creation of all technical regulations. The history of this office is quite unique.
Although its existence began at the end of the 19th century to make sure that the
country would use the metric system and its authority was exclusively that of the
measurements authority (Departamentode Pesas y Medidas), during the Second
World War, the Mexican government decided to overtake the activity of creation of
industrial standards within this office by creating a measurement and standards
office under the old Ley de Normas Pesasy Medidas.
The reason for the government to take over an activity that was clearly of a
private sector nature was justified as a temporary measure and to make sure that the
Mexican industry would have information to meet the requirements deriving from
its exports of war materials to the United States.
While the Government took over the responsibility of writing the standards on
behalf of the private sector, (since, by definition standards are private - nonmandatory documents), initially the governmentally issued standards had no
mandatory effect.
However, at some point in time someone in the government decided to make the
standards mandatory, not a difficult task because the Government had, until very
recently, absolute control of the Mexican Congress, by approving the old Ley de
NormasPesas y Medidas without taking into consideration that there is an intrinsic
contradiction in the use of the word "normas"(standards) and the mandatory effect
of its contents, which, legally should have been within the scope of "Reglamentos"
(Regulations).
As a result, Mexico had legislation providing for "mandatory standards", which
is a strange animal. These were called "'NormasOficiales Mexicanas" or NOMS.
As the years went by, governmental authorities issued mandatory regulations or
"Normas Oficiales Mexicanas" which, as stated above is a real conceptual mistake,
because those should be regulations due to their mandatory nature. Legally, there
was a problem, still continuing these days, because the government authorities
issuing the standards should not have authority to issue technical regulations. In
Mexico the authority to issue regulations to implement legislation is vested only in
the President.2
The government, through SECOFI for several decades, issued under the same
name of "Normas OficialesMexicanas", technical regulations and standards. So to
increase the confusion, there were "Normas Oficiales Mexicanas" that could be
either voluntary or mandatory, depending on the situation. If the entire text of the

1. The agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which constituted the GATT Standards Code, had been
renegotiated in preparation for the New World Trade Organization, so the definitions used in the NAFTA
negotiations were those already agreed under GATT. The untested part of these definitions, was the inclusion of
technical regulations and standards for "services", inasmuch as traditionally, GATT and its Standards code had dealt
only with trade in goods.
2. Constituci6n Polftica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. Art. 89(1) providing for the President to
promulgate and execute laws has been interpreted to give the President exclusive power to issue enforceable
regulations to implement laws
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regulation was published in the Federal Gazette, the norms were mandatory, whereas
if only the name of the standard was published, they were voluntary.
SECOFI coordinated the committees that were drafting the standards and
mandatory regulations, and, of course, as was the case with each governmental
ministry that issued these mandatory "Normas Oficiales Mexicanas" had to oversee
compliance thereof.
Additionally, aside from the grave conceptual problem with the way it handled
its standards system, there was a lack of coordination between governmental
authorities, since not only SECOFI was issuing regulations under the "normas"
name, but also other authorities such as the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of
Communications and Transportation, the Ministry of Labor and even the Ministry
of Agriculture, issued technical regulations as "normas" thereby making the system
quite confusing and chaotic.
For example, the Ministry of Health might issue health regulations (named
"Normas Tcnicas Sanitarias") that could in some instances be incompatible in
contents, with the technical regulations on industry or commercial labeling
requirements issued by SECOFI. 3
Another problematic issue was that there was not a single body organizing and
coordinating the issuance of standards. It was then, and it is still today, a problem
for the federal government to resolve.
There was a myriad of technical regulations, aside from problems with identity
of the standards, until July 1992, when a new Federal Law on Metrology and
Standardization was enacted, trying to solve all of the problems caused by history.
Since 1992, Mexican standards (voluntary specifications for goods and services) are
known as Normas Mexicanas or "NMXs" to differentiate them from the technical
regulations or, NOM's.
Mexico became a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) in 1986 and as you may imagine the Mexican Government had initially no
expertise as to the rules of international trade.
Furthermore, in 1987, Mexico had the highest inflation rates in its recent history
reaching levels of up to 170% a year. So when the new administration of President
Salinas de Gortari entered the picture in 1998, one of the methods used in an attempt
to reduce inflation was the use of unilateral duty reductions, to facilitate the imports
of foreign competing goods at low tariffs thereby helping to curb inflation.
On the side, the Federal Government would also negotiate with specific industry
sectors concerning price settings in order to reduce inflation. If the industry refused
to decrease prices, the government had the ability to open the market to foreign
goods and by reducing the duties that were previously imposed upon these goods,
local producers were being aggressively invited to become more competitive and to
offer goods in Mexico at international prices.

3. An example, of this was the case of Sodas where the Ministry of Health atone point insisted that the term
"Refrescos" should be changed to a technical term "Aguas Edulcoradas" "Sweetened Water". while SECOFI
maintained that the term "Refresco" (or soda) was acceptable because that was the traditional term used by industry
and by consumers. This kinds of contradictions was problematic, but an unfortunate fact of life prior to NAFTA.
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During this process Mexico discovered that not all imports are equal and a lot of
trash imported goods were coming into the country, and domestic industry in
Mexico was under a lot of pressure, to compete in internationally unfair conditions.
It was at this time that Mexico discovered the flexibility of the use of technical
barriers to trade as a swift mechanism to regulate imports, particularly against
certain imports.4

Industry would complain to the government about the numerous competing
imports flowing into the country. These products were simply being dumped into
Mexico. Therefore, technical barriers were in many instances used as a mechanism
of defense from unfair trade by requiring Chinese and other products to meet
particular physical characteristics.
Having introduced the history of the problem, we proceed to the advent of
NAFTA.
ITI. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MEXICAN AND AMERICAN
STANDARDIZATION SYSTEMS
In the early 1990s, negotiations for a new GATT Standards Code5 had already
been completed and had reconfirmed the distinction between "technical regulations"
and "standards" and both of these definitions included the adaptations to "services",
not only to goods. This changed the whole scope of GATT and created a potential
risk to international trade because of the rules implemented for the management of
this type of trade.
The picture in Mexico then, was of a standard and technical regulations system
characterized by that lack of order as to its management in an economy everyday
more pressured to become competitive at international levels. Mexico, like most
Latin American countries had concentrated its standardization activity in
governmental bodies, making patent the need to create a formal, credible and
reliable, private standardization and certification bodies to support the voluntary
quality standards drive and its assessment. Mexico needed also to create private
standardization and private conformity assessment bodies similar to those existing
in the US and in many developed countries because prior to this time the
government was inefficiently conducting all of the issuing of standards, technical
regulations, testing for compliance, and enacting all of the authorization procedures.
The international trade strategy of Mexico was to make its standard related system
resemble those of its international trading partners to make sure that trade could
flow under similar rules and parallel systems.
One problem Mexico encountered was that it did not know how to form these
bodies, so help was sought from the European Union. This is a fact not commonly
known. We told the Europeans that if they didn't help Mexico, we were going to
enter into a free trade agreement with the United States and because our
standardization system was, to say the least in shambles, most likely it would be
taken over by the American market forces and private sector organizations, thereby
4. Of primary concern were the Chinese products aimed at the U.S. market which for some reason could
not pass the U.S. standards or market tests.
5. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (GATT Standards Code), GATr Basic Instruments and
Selected Documents (Geneva: GATT Secretariat 1980)
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jeopardizing any meeting of the systems with the European countries. Within five
days the Europeans authorized a grant of $2 million in ECUS6 . These funds were
provided in order to assist the Mexican government in strengthening this project of
privatization and enhancement of its standardization system.
This is important, not only because of the many references in Chapter Nine of
NAFTA to international standards, but because Mexico's approach was to use
potential allies before facing the negotiations with the largest economy in the world.
There is an interesting phenomenon in the establishment of standards through
international organizations such as the International Standards Organization (ISO).
International standards are approved through the majority vote of their members and
each country has one vote. Under this mechanism, the United States has one vote
while the European Union has 15 votes (since Europe notwithstanding that it may
have a Common European standardization policy, has one vote for each one of its
member countries), thereby giving the European Union a substantially greater
influence in the international standardization bodies than that of the United States.
The United States typically argues, often times with reason, that some of its
standards ARE the international standards (and not the ones approved by international
standardization bodies) because they are more widely used in international markets.
Notwithstanding that Mexico and other countries may not agree with this
American argument there are several examples that show that due to the strength of
the American economy and its industries, this may be true. An example may be the
fact that the United States is the only country still using the British Imperial
Measurement System7 , and although clearly different than the international rule, it
is still followed in several industries just because the reigning technology is sourced
in the United States. Moving away from these practices may impose several
inconveniences for the countries wishing to move towards international rules.'
With these types of issues lurking, Mexico sat down at the negotiation table with
the United States and Canada with a plan to rearrange the Mexican structure of
standards and technical regulations. With the support of the European Union,
Mexico was embarked in a frantic race to create private bodies, to establish more
accredited and reputable standards, and to back up its production and exports
platform with quality assurance programs. All these efforts take a great deal of
money and a lot of time.
IV. THE NEGOTIATION AND CONTENTS OF CHAPTER NINE OF NAFTA,
AT A GLIMPSE
At the beginning of the negotiations, Mexico knew that its standards related
system was somewhat deficient, while the United States had a tremendous standard
writing system and testing capacity. In fact, the United States has more standards
and more technical regulations than the entire rest of the world put together.
Therefore, we naively suggested, as a first approach, that because technical barriers,

6. The then existing European currency Unit, now substituted by the Euro.
7. Paradoxically even the British have changed to the metric system, but the U.S refuses to change
8. A good example maybe the presentation cards, which are sized, in Mexico and in most countries to the
US and not the international standard, which follow the size of the paper cutting machines, which during many years
were either manufactuerd in America, or using technology originated in America.
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standards and technical regulations add additional costs to trade, the three countries
should simply get rid of them. We suggested further that the three countries
involved start from scratch and create uniform North American standards as a
mechanism to assure free flow of goods and services.
Our counterparts in the United States and Canada were quite amused with this
proposition and quickly declined. The United States went further to state that,
politically Chapter Nine should be the "green chapter" of NAFTA and expected to
create a strong message that NAFTA would not work to deteriorate the environment
and a mechanism to move polluting jobs south. Indeed the US government was
getting a great deal of political pressure from non-governmental environmental
organizations fearful of the impact of trade with Mexico on the environment.
Paradoxically at the end, NAFTA's Chapter Nine was not green enough for the
United States and a parallel agreement on environmental matters was necessary as
a prerequisite for the approval of the treaty.
There were two principles involved in the overall negotiations of NAFTA. It
should be GATT "plus", that is the exact level of commitment and disciplines
contained under GATT, plus more attractive results than whatever was agreed to
under such a multilateral agreement.
The second principle in the negotiations was "No Back Sliding", meaning that
there could be no agreement that were less beneficial than those the Canadians and
the Americans had already agreed upon in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
Looking at the text of the Chapter, we find several interesting explanations for the
text:
Article 903 is a ratification of GATT , only because the text of the GATT
Standards Code had already been approved at the Uruguay round ofnegotiations
and we knew that any inconsistency between the two sets of rules could require
reopening the negotiations in GATT's Standards Code, which, we all feared
could have been a disaster. Mexico had that safe harbor.
The message that Chapter Nine was to be the green chapter of NAFTA is to be
found in Article 904, which says, regardless of GATT, each country has the full
right "to adopt, maintain or apply any such standards related to protect the
environment and health of its population as it considers appropriate... ."' This is a
nice concept that politicians find appealing. It was drafted to send a strong message
that the United States was not going to accept any deterioration of its environmental
and health regulations because of NAFTA.
Article 904 provides not only for the right to set standards, but also the right to
set the level of standards. For example, Mexico uses in many instance agricultural
pesticides and fungicides that are cheap, basically because the patents have expired.
The US may validly stop the imports of Mexican agricultural products using these
pesticides arguing that it could become a health hazard.

9. Article 903: "Further to Article 104, the Parties affirm with respect to each other their existing rights and
obligations relating to standards-related measures under the GATT Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and
all other international agreements, including environmental and conservation agreements, to which such Parties are
party."
10. Art. 904(2) standards are to be "in accordance with Art. 907(2)" which provides that a party to NAFTA

"should avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions between similar goods or services" indetermining the level of
protection it considers appropriate.
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But it may very well be the truth that large American chemical companies claim
(when their patents have expired) and the pesticides become cheaper, that the
product using such chemicals somehow becomes a health risk. This companies have
huge investments in technology and development which is only fully recoverable
during the life of a patent, but they also have the lobbying power to convince the
government to establish levels of protection that in some instances are ridiculously
high. "
So the U.S. Government took a very strong position as to the "level of protection"
to health mainly because the U.S. government needed to assure everyone that
NAFTA would not result in the deterioration of its rules for protecting the health of
its citizens and the environment, but not really making sure that trade will be
assured.
Under the foregoing argument, this "green chapter" became a hostage of political
issues. Under these circumstances, the only other available alternative to the
Mexicans, not being in a position to accept U.S. standards, was to use the GATT
standards. As a result, we proposed international standards. Mexico knew that there
was a clash between Europe and the United States over international standards and
technical regulations, but Mexico needed a safe harbor somewhere.
This safe harbor is found in the strong reference to international standards
contained in NAFTA's paragraph 905. However the second part of Article 905
basically dilutes what the first part of 905 establishes 2 . Specifically, there is a desire
to use international standards, but in practice, the three governments can do basically
whatever they want.
Mexico convinced the United States and Canadian governments that there should
be consideration for local conditions by inserting in the text of paragraph 905
wording

related

to

"CLIMATIC,

GEOGRAPHICAL,

TECHNOLOGICAL

OR

but had to agree to the United States proposal not to
be bound to use international standards "where such standards would3 be an
INEFFECTIVE OR INAPPROPRIATE MEANStO fulfill it's legitimate objective."'
In conclusion this language basically means that if Mexico, Canada or the United
States do not feel that international standards are as good as its own standards they
will be able to use their own standards. Mexico, the less developed economy can
always argue infrastructural factors and the United States or Canada, could argue
that an international rule is simply inappropriate. 4
INFRASTRUCTURAL FACTORS"

per million of carcinogens, in a particular product
11.Sometimes the allowable intake, measured in parts
is such that it would allow an individual eating three apples a day a reasonable possibility that when he is 90 years
old he will get cancer because of the eating of the apples. That could be the "level of protection" triggering a
justifiable ban on imports due to threats to human health.
12. "Each Party SHALL USE, as a basis for its standards-related measures, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS or
EXCEPT WHERE SUCH STANDARDS WOULD BE AN
internationl standards whose completion is imminent ........
INEFFECTIVE OR INAPPROPRiATE MEANS TO FULFILL ITS LEGTMATE OBJECTIVES, for example because of
fundamental climatic, geographical, technological or infrastrctural factors, scientific justification or the level of
protection that the Party considers appropriate".
13. Art. 905(3): Nothing in paragraph I shall be construed to prevent a party, in pursuing its legitimate
objectives, from adopting, maintaining or applying any standards-related measure that results in a higher level of
protection than would be achieved if the measure were based on the relevant international standard.
14. An example of an infrastructural factor would be a Mexican electrical system, which is supposed to
match the U.S. system. The voltage used in the United States is 110 volts, plus or minus ten percent, whereas
Mexico supposedly operates at 127 volts plus or minus ten percent. However, in the real world, with the
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As you may deduce, ultimately, the three countries failed to resolve this problem.
That is why technical barriers to trade, in my opinion, are a highly risky part of the
free trade agreement.
If the U.S. negotiators could not agree to North American Standards or North
American Rules, as originally proposed by Mexico, a second tier alternative was to
try to make the standards between the countries "compatible". This is what
paragraph 906 seeks to achieve. This article states, in subsection 2, that "without
reducing the level of safety or of protection of human, animal or plant life or health,
the environment or consumers, ... THE PARTIES SHALL, to the greatest extent

practicable, MAKE COMPATIBLE THEIR RESPECTIVE STANDARDS RELATED MEASURES,
so as to facilitate trade in a good or service between the parties."
If one looks at the definition of "making compatible" under paragraph 915 ",this
statement may be only little less than a dream.
The preceding paragraphs of this Chapter deal with the creation of the rules and
the standards, and paragraphs 907 and 908 contain similar principles specifically
addressing compliance with the rules, that is known as "conformity assessment".

Interestingly, paragraph 908, contains an agreement to recognize, "wherever
appropriate" the other countries' test results and confomity of procedures. We may
expect that the wording "wherever appropriate" language be interpreted by the
different countries to mean "don't recognize".
Again, in the section dealing with conformity assessment we find that Chapter
Nine keeps a wide open door because it expressly recognizes "the existence of
substantial differences in the structure, organization, and operation of conformity
assessment procedures in their respective territories" thereby allowing for any of
these differences to become a good excuse not to recognize conformity assessment
procedures compatible or acceptable at all.
It gets scarier. The fact that paragraph 908 contains a recognition, by the three
countries, of substantial differences in the structure of each country's organization
and the operation of the conformity assessment bodies, made clear from the
beginning that the disciplines or wishes of Chapter Nine will not apply to private
entities, which in the case of the United States and Canada handle the majority of
the conformity assessment procedures to determine compliance with a specific
standard or technical regulation. In the case of Mexico, unlike that of Canada and
United States, and as described before, conformity assessment activities have been
almost entirely within the activities of the federal government. Therefore, it was
really in Mexico's best interest to accept the text of this paragraph 908 because the
U.S. government, as a federal government, has very few procedures to directly
oversee compliance with technical regulations and basically no assurance capability
when relating to the compliance of standards, while in Mexico, practically
everything was regulated at the federal level.

government owned electricity company in Mexico, that plus or minus ten percent may actually be fifty percenL
Therefore, electrical products designed for the U.S. market often will not work in Mexico. That's an infrastructural
problem under which Mexico could enact electricity safety regulations imposing difficulties for the importation of

US or Canadian products.
15. Art. 915: "make compatible means bring different standards-related measures of the same scope

approved by different standardizing bodies to a level such that they are either identical, equivalent, or have the effect
of permitting goods or services to be used in place of one another or fulfill'the same purpose"
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In Mexico trade authority (which is the authority under which a great deal of the
technical regulations are created), is exclusively vested in the federal government
while in the United States, trade authority is mainly vested in the governments of
individual states or local governments.
Paragraph 908(2) contains also a commitment as to mutual recognition and
mutual accreditation of conformity assessment bodies in the other parties' territory. 6
This translates into an obligation for the Mexican government to negotiate with the
U.S. government, the accreditation or licensing of laboratories and other private
conformity assessment organizations located in the U.S. Territory. Underwriters
Laboratory is one example.
The three countries should negotiate not only the recognition of the test result
(contained typically in a written report) but also grant an accreditation of foreign
entities granting them valid local authority and validity to the tests and assessments
performed elsewhere.
Since the federal government in the United States, does not license conformity
assessment bodies or testing laboratories, it could not grant this benefit to Mexican
organizations, public or private. So what Mexico did in 1997 by amending its
Federal Law on Metrology and Standardization, was to privatize the accreditation
activity and place it in the hands of the private sector, which, as stated under
paragraph 902, does not bind private sector organizations.
Paragraph 908 (2) was the last portion of the chapter to be agreed and was
"bracketed" until the final stages of the negotiations.' 7 My recollection is that this
section was taken to the lead negotiators with the concern that if we were going to
have free trade, Mexico would need assurances that it would be able to avoid
technical barriers to trade by demonstrating compliance with the rules. If Mexico
had a good laboratory, it seemed reasonable that the U.S. government should
recognize it as a dependable organization. However the U.S. government did not and
does not have such authority or activity and in fact the US private sector strongly
opposes any governmental intervention in these activities.
At that point in time, the funds provided by the European Community had been
used to foster the creation of private standard related bodies and we had made
intense consultations with the Mexican private sector as to this particular topic 5 . As
a result, the discussion as to the acceptance or not of the recognition of U.S. tests
laboratories and U.S. conformity assessment bodies by the Mexican government
became almost a strategic and sovereignty issue.
The text of paragraph 908(2) was also heavily discussed by the higher authority
and almost became a deal breaker. Mexico strongly argued that it could agree to it,
16. Although not defined under the text of NAFFA, accreditation is a formal recognition, by a competent
authority (such as the federal Government in Mexico) of the technical capacity of a conformity assesment body or
testing laboratory to perform its activites and without it, there is no valid activity to be performed by such body or
laboratory.
17. A rule during the negotiation process was to place within brackets the unagreed text that was then to be
discussed by the higher authority of the negotiators.
18. The Mexican government created a consulting mechanism with the private sector known as Cuarto de
at Lado or the room next door, where there would be one or more representatives of private sector organizations
sitting by in a room near the negotiating room, being ready for any consultation, comments or even opposition of
the daily outcome of the governmental negotiation meetings. This mechanism proved very useful not only as a
validation to the decision making process, but also as an effective meeting to get fresh ideas and arguments by well
informed representatives of the Mexican private sector.
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but needed about 20 years to create the infrastructure to allow its laboratories and
conformity assessment bodies to be placed on an even keel. The negotiators for the
United States claimed that since a college degree can be obtained in four years,
Mexico should be able to accomplish this task in four years as well. We ultimately
agreed in Annex 908.2 to the 4-year grace period. This is the explanation for the
deferral of this commitment being tied to a four-year period, which was to elapse in
1998.
However in 1997, the Mexican government amended the Federal Law on
Metrology and Standardization 9 by introducing, among other reforms, Articles 70
A, 70 B and 70 C in order to create the "EntidadMexicana de Acreditaci6n", as a
private sector organization with the authority to accredit, license or recognize any
conformity assessment body (including testing laboratories) to operate under
Mexican laws. The purpose of these amendments was to strengthen the private
standardization system that was to be managed by the private sector in the 1992
legislation.2"
Paragraph 909 created a new mechanism that I greatly appreciate. This Article
requires each Party to publish a notice of a proposed technical regulation 60 days
prior to adoption. It was a very difficult decision then because the Mexican
government had to create internal mechanisms to allow for a common procedure for
the publication of drafts, which was completely strange to our government. But this
is good. Once one is in the private sector it is good to see a draft. If there are
mistakes, they can then be easily fixed. That, I think, is positive.
We learned during the negotiation process with the United States and Canada that
standards become an issue for everything related to trade and if no agreement can
be reached in the text of the treaty, we did agree that future work would be
constantly needed. For this reason, under paragraph 913, a Committee on Standards
Related Measures was established.
There are four separate sub-committees established to work on special standards.
There was a parallel section on NAFTA dealing with land transportation. The same
happened with telecommunications. The opening of the telecommunications and
technical standards contained some of the main issues, as did the recognition of the
important role of automotive standards.
Some might ask why there is an Automotive Standards Council and not a
subcommittee in the other three cases. The answer is because the automotive
standards were too important in the trade between Mexico and the United States.
They weren't satisfied with being called a mere "subcommittee". These petty types
of issues, believe it or not, cropped up during the internal negotiations and trilateral
negotiations.
Finally, there is a special subcommittee on the labeling of textile and apparel
goods. Why? It happened during the opening of the border between the United
States and Mexico. There were a lot of imports of Chinese clothing pouring into
Mexico. We knew that labeling, per se, could be a legal way to fully stop trade. If
Mexico required labeling in the metric system and in Spanish, we would only be

19. D.O. May 20, 1997
20. See, generally the original text of the Federal Law of Metrology and Standardization as published in
the D.O., (July 2, 1992).
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able to trade ten percent of what we are now doing. And in this particular case we
were under a lot of pressure due to tremendous imports of Chinese clothing. The
problem with clothing was the existence of the U.S. multi-fiber agreement, which
is a quota agreement to protect the U.S. textile markets. Fashion poses a particular
problem because completely new clothing lines develop four or five times a year.
All of the clothing that did not qualify for the U.S. market was dumped into Mexico
and as a result, the Mexican apparel industry was hurting.
Therefore, in 1989 we talked with the Mexican customs authority, and they
amended the customs regulations slightly to make it illegal to import apparel without
complying with the Mexican labeling and technical standards. For example, the
labeling authority at that time was under the Consumer Protection Law. This law
was not drafted as a standard but as a ministerial decree. The decree provided that
labeling for clothing should be sewn into the garment and monitored at the border.
This created a huge problem because nobody could comply with it. This was so
because when you manufacture a piece of clothing you must put the label in at a
certain time in the process, not after the product is already packaged. Therefore, this
new regulation required reopening everything before it could cross the border. All
of a sudden seamstresses were hired in El Paso just to open packages and put labels
on the items. It was a disaster because we did it wrong. We failed to notify the
companies in advance and this was a clear violation of GATT. However, the United
States government helped us so we would not be taken to a GATT disciplinary
panel. Nevertheless, this was a hot issue so Mexico had to create the subcommittee
for textile labeling.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF NAFTA ON THE MEXICAN STANDARD RELATED
LEGAL SYSTEM
Breaching a NAFTA agreement is different from breaching GATT or other
multilateral agreements. Under GATT or other multilateral agreements a breach can
be resolved only by negotiations with other countries as groups and it is much more
difficult to create a panic. NAFIA on the other hand, is very different because there
is a direct bilateral relationship and everyone is monitoring one another. For this
reason, NAFTA has become a much more effective tool than other international
trade agreements.
Paragraph 908 is just an example of many of the important issues related to
NAFTA. This particular issue was a very difficult decision for Mexico and it took
several years to reach a consensus on how better to face the challenge and come up
with a legal strategy to make sure that without violating NAFTA, Mexico could
continue to have control over its standard related policy and its crucial conformity
assessment activities.
By other substantial changes, (and I honestly believe it was for the benefit of
Mexico, the federal government consented for the first time to publish drafts of
technical regulations, as a result of Paragraph 909. With the limited capacity of the
Mexican government, drafting documents and publishing them is always done under
extreme pressure. 2' That is why typically every regulation in Mexico becomes

21.

"Further to Articles 1802 (Publication) and 1803 of the law on (Notification and Provision of
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effective the following day after it is published in the Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n
(Federal Gazette).
Because of NAFTA the Federal government of Mexico has now to publish the
drafts in advance of the adoption of technical regulations and allow everyone to
comment on them. For the Mexican Government, publishing drafts became a hassle
because it was not used to working that way. The Mexican government and its

officers, including myself, had traditionally taken comments from no one.
Again, the 1997 amendments were designed to foster private sector participation.
In order for the Mexican government not to violate NAFTA, by refusing to accredit
foreign laboratories and foreign testing organizations, it had to recognize the
technical competence of a testing laboratory or conformity evaluation body.
Therefore, what the Mexican government did was to privatize this activity in
Mexico. This should also prove to be a good decision.
This move will give Mexico an enhanced position to negotiate reciprocity
agreements because Article 908 demands recognition and accreditation, but it does
not have a reciprocity provision.22
Directly resulting from NAIFTA, Mexico's legislation clearly differentiates today
the four basic areas of technical regulations and standards:
(1) Calibration laboratories are critical to measurement. Without measurement
there is no quality and no technology. There must be good traceability and
measurement laboratories in order to have good quality and technology.
(2) Test laboratories are organizations like Underwriters Laboratories. A
testing organization tests a product and provides the results, whereas a
certification body oversees the whole process.
(3) The certification bodies not only certify the test results but also assure that
everything else is in order to use the stamp marked that everything is up to
standard. There is a slight difference between a testing organization and a
certification body.
(4) Verification Units are concerned with matters such as labeling, specifically
whether a country is in compliance with labeling standards. The labels aren't
tested, you just read them, and if they are according to the books, they are
deemed to comply. This is verification.

Information), each Party proposing to adopt or modify a technical regulation, shall:
(a) at least 60 days prior to the adoption or modification of such technical regulation, other than
a law, publish a notice and notify in writing the other Parties of the proposed measure in such
a manner as to enable interested persons to become acquainted with such measure, except that
in the case of any such measure related to perishable goods, each Party shall, to the greatest
extent practicable, publish such notice and provide such notification at least 30 days prior to the
adoption or modification of such measure, but no later than when notification is provided to
domestic producers"
22. For example, if today Underwriters Laboratories comes into Mexico and asks to be recognized as a
testing laboratory, Mexico has no obligation to recognize it, although not to do so would be difficult given the fact
that ULhas been around for 100 years. Mexico has no equivalent to Underwriters Laboratories, which could ask
the U.S. government for recognition of its technical capabilities. The concept of reciprocity is justified not only
because of fairness, but it also gives Mexican entities adequate time to become reliable. It also makes it easier for
the government to look at the results of the performance of these bodies instead collectively rather than having to
go after each individual and each importer.
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VI. FINAL COMMENTS
When I was Director General of Standards, that office had 1,300 employees and
fifty percent of these employees were poorly paid inspectors. It was a disaster.
These employees were charged with tasks of ensuring that gas pumps were
measuring gas adequately, and seeing that products were properly labeled. Mexico
made a policy decision to privatize this activity in an attempt to avoid corruption
and gain credibility and efficiency. It was impossible that these employees were
going to be the most honorable people in the world when they were being paid four
hundred pesos a month, and given no education or information. Sad but true. This
task has since been placed in the hands of the private sector. If there is corruption,
it is not the government's fault.
There is one more area that is particularly sensitive and poses a potential problem.
It is the definition of what constitutes a technical regulation. If we remember that
Chapter Nine is the "green chapter" of NAFTA and that the "services" component
is included in that Chapter, we must clearly follow up on Chapter Nine's definition
of "technical regulation" as "a document which lays down the goods' characteristics
OR THEIR RELATED PROCESSES AND PRODUCTION METHODS..." These words could
potentially be interpreted that a product such as apparel being imported from Mexico
be subject to technical regulations requiring that it be manufactured using a process
that is "environmentally friendly" or "with labor conditions that are comparable to
the United States" (the products RELATED PROCESSES).
Standard related matters are a tricky subject and will require in depth discussion
and continuing analysis. In conclusion, technical regulations can be very disruptive
to trade. In my mind, they are often in place for the sole purpose of either disrupting
trade or at least increasing the exporter's costs.
As tariffs are reduced, the role of standards related measures is an area that will
start to become increasingly noticeable. That is just an example of why, in the end,
the free trade rules and disciplines may be too limited or ineffective to assure free
trade to be permanently successful. In the end, the ultimate solution may be a
common North American Common Market, but that is another issue altogether.

